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Abstract
Food policy councils (FPCs) are an embodiment of food democracy, providing a space for community members, profes-
sionals, and government to learn together, deliberate, and collectively devise place-based strategies to address complex
food systems issues. These collaborative governance networks can be considered a transitional stage in the democratic
process, an intermediary institution that coordinates interests not typically present in food policymaking. In practice, FPCs
are complex and varied. Due to this variety, it is not entirely clear how the structure, membership, and relationship to gov-
ernment of an FPC influence its policy priorities. This article will examine the relationship between an FPC’s organizational
structure, relationship to government, and membership and its policy priorities. Using data from a 2018 survey of FPCs
in the United States by the Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future paired with illustrative cases, we find that an FPC’s
relationship to government and membership have more bearing on its policy priorities than the organizational structure.
Further, the cases illustrate howmembership is determined and deliberation occurs, highlighting the difficulty of including
underrepresented voices in the process.
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1. Introduction
Food policy councils (FPCs) are promoted as an expres-
sion of food democracy, creating a space for profes-
sionals, business, government, and community mem-
bers to learn together and to galvanize collective action
around policy strategies to address complex food sys-
tems issues. Food policy is a relatively new policy arena
at the local level (Pothukuchi & Kaufman, 2000); there-
fore, new forms of collaboration and governance, such
as FPCs, emerge to serve as a voice for the community,
in turn helping government to navigate its role in this
arena (Mendes, 2008). FPCs work at scales not dom-
inated by powerful global institutions (Sonnino, 2013)
and challenge corporate hegemony in food and agri-
culture (Hassanein, 2003). They tend to tackle “wicked
problems” that require boundary-spanning relationships
among stakeholders across sectors based on trust, inter-
dependence, and a need for new norms and approaches
(Williams, 2002). FPCs provide a forum for a diversity of
stakeholders to express their values and deliberate about
how to change the food system. These fora reflect the
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unique history, political culture, and socioeconomic char-
acteristics of a place, which is why no two FPCs are identi-
cal in form (Dahlberg, Clancy,Wilson, &O’Donnell, 1997).
The scholarship on FPCs is inconsistent and incom-
plete in terms of understanding the influence of the
form—hereafter considered to be organizational struc-
ture, relationship to government, and membership—of
an FPC on its policy priorities and actions. The literature
is mostly comprised of examination of FPCs of a particu-
lar organizational structure, such as those embedded in
government versus those incorporated as a nonprofit or-
ganization, or case studies of individual FPCs.
This article seeks to understand how FPCs, as a ve-
hicle for democratic participation, represent the values
of a community. In particular, we analyze the relation-
ship between structural factors and policy orientation,
that is, how does an FPC’s form influence the food sys-
tems issues (policy priorities) that an FPC decides to fo-
cus on? To answer this question, we first contextualize
how FPCs and food democracy literature relate to con-
cepts of participatory democracy and collaborative gov-
ernance networks. Using data froma 2018 survey of FPCs
by the Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future (CLF),
we then explore the relationship between the form and
policy priorities of FPCs across the United States (US).
Following this analysis, we present three cases to illus-
trate how these relationshipswork in practice. Finally, we
discuss the implications of key elements of our findings
on FPCs’ policy work and conclude with suggestions for
further research on the processes of public participation
in food democracy through FPCs.
2. Food Democracy and Collaborative Governance
The merits of representative versus direct democracy
have been debated in the US since the late 18th century
(Roberts, 2004). Key to the debate was, and continues to
be, the extent to which government can accommodate
citizen participation andwhose values are represented in
policymaking. The nature of problems facing the country
have changed over the past two centuries (with greater
complexity and globalized relationships), as have notions
of representation by government officials. This debate
and the changing nature of problems are not unique to
the US. In the US, though, efforts by rights movements
demanding greater participation of marginalized popu-
lations in political processes and by the federal govern-
ment to urge citizen participation in government deci-
sions have helped to codify expectations of participation
(Roberts, 2004).
Food systems are one arena in which the legitimacy
of representation by government is being challenged.
Food democracy builds upon theories of direct citizen
participation, whereby “members of society (those not
holding office or administrative positions in government)
share power with public officials in making substantive
decisions and in taking actions related to the commu-
nity” (Roberts, 2004, p. 320). Corporate consolidation
of farm and food businesses, rising income inequality,
and historic and systemic racial injustice all contribute to
food system problems. Furthermore, citizens are skepti-
cal about the federal government being representative
of and accountable to all citizens. As growing corporate
influence on federal food policy undermines citizens’ de-
sires for transparency in food production and distribu-
tion (Petetin, 2016), calls for consumers and producers to
regain control of food systems through participation in lo-
cal governance have emerged (Hassanein, 2003; Renting,
Schermer,&Rossi, 2012).Moreover, political gridlock has
disrupted the federal food and agriculture policy regime,
creating a space at the local level for collaboration and
debate aboutwhose values are being represented in pub-
lic policy decisions about food (Hassanein, 2003; Renting
et al., 2012; Sheingate, 2014).
FPCs provide a forum to practice food democracy
by way of working with government rather than tak-
ing an adversarial approach (Andrée, Clark, Levkoe, &
Lowitt, 2019). They counter the problems of represen-
tational democracy serving mostly well-resourced inter-
est groups by coordinating citizens, both lay stakeholders
and paid professionals, from sectors and interests across
the food supply chain and political institutions to address
food system issues (Clancy, Hammer, & Lippoldt, 2007).
Lay stakeholders can be defined as “unpaid citizens who
have a deep interest in some public concern and thus are
willing to invest substantial time and energy to represent
and serve those who have similar interests or perspec-
tives but choose not to participate” (Fung, 2006, p. 68).
Paid professionals include staff from nonprofit organiza-
tions that serve the interests of marginalized communi-
ties affected by food systems issues, small and mid-sized
farm operators, farm workers, and local and regional
farm and food businesses. Central to food democracy is
participation by citizens or organizations representing cit-
izens who have traditionally been excluded from political
and economic processes.
FPCs are a participatory democratic undertaking that
build on elements of both direct and representative
democracy. While on the surface FPCs may appear to
be in opposition to a representative democracy, in prac-
tice, they function aswhat public administration scholars
call collaborative governance networks. FPCs embody a
transitional stage in the democratic process by moving
representative democracy away from the dominant ne-
oliberal agenda toward greater citizen participation in re-
sponse to the complexity of food systems problems (Klijn
& Skelcher, 2007). Food systems problems involve a mul-
titude of ever-evolving, context-specific decisions about
environmental resource allocation, economic viability,
equity, and welfare across multiple levels of government.
As public administration literature has expounded, policy
solutions to complex problems, particularly at the local
level, benefit from collaborative governance approaches
(Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Citizen participation in
the policy process—from formation (input) to decision-
making (throughput)—lends legitimacy to policies (out-
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put) as reflections of the values of citizens (Schmidt,
2013) and can lead to greater acceptance by the pop-
ulace (Roberts, 2004). As collaborative governance net-
works, FPCs provide a space for citizens and government
representatives to collectively navigate a policy prob-
lem and work towards shared goals. They engage citi-
zens to build political capital and hold government ac-
countable to the public interest (Schiff, 2008). In doing
so, they add to the effectiveness of the policy process
by making the process more transparent, inclusive and
open (Bornemann & Weiland, 2019; Harper, Shattuck,
Holt-Giménez, Alkon, & Lambrick, 2009; Schmidt, 2013;
Sørensen & Torfing, 2018).
Members of collaborative governance networks and
their relationships can drive the networks’ decisions and
actions (Ansell & Gash, 2008), and in the instance of
FPCs, their eventual policy work (Koski, Siddiki, Sadiq, &
Carboni, 2018). Scholars have explored dynamics related
to participation and representation on FPCs (Clancy et al.,
2007; Dahlberg et al., 1997; Harper et al., 2009; Schiff,
2008), emphasizing that FPCs should take a systems-
based perspective on membership from across three
axes: across domains (e.g., health, education, economic
development), across the supply chain (e.g., produc-
tion, retail, distribution), and across sectors (e.g., pub-
lic, private, community; Irish, Clark, Banks, Palmer, &
Santo, 2017). Members become “boundary spanners”
by crossing organizational and sector boundaries, creat-
ing a bridge that enables a systems-oriented approach
(Williams, 2002). The specific permutation of members
looks different for every FPC, as do the processes by
whichmembers engage in decisions and actions. The vari-
ations in FPCmembership composition and processes re-
flect the dimensions of what Fung (2006) has termed the
“democracy cube”: who participates and how those par-
ticipants are selected, the authority and power granted
to participants, and how members derive decisions. The
interaction of these dimensions influences the policy pri-
orities and actions of FPCs.
Furthermore, membership alone does not necessar-
ily translate directly to policy change. As Koski et al.
(2018) point out, descriptive representation, or “repre-
sentation on paper,” is not substantive representation,
or “representation in practice.” In their study of one
council, the authors found that who is at the table influ-
ences what is on the agenda, but it is not a clear one-
to-one relationship (Koski et al., 2018). An overempha-
sis on process, open structure, unequal capacity and re-
sources across members, and lack of a shared goal con-
tributes to the discrepancy between descriptive and sub-
stantive representation (Koski et al., 2018). Findings from
previous research on how other factors, such as orga-
nizational structure and relationship to government, in-
fluence the policy work of FPCs are mixed. For FPCs in
California, structural autonomy alongside strong collabo-
ration with government was key to creating more inclu-
sive policies and building connections between commu-
nity members and government (Gupta et al., 2018). Yet a
study of FPCs across the US found that FPC structuremay
not be a significant factor in its policy strategies but may
dependmore on local influences and available resources
(DiGiulio, 2017).
The forms and decision-making processes of FPCs are
complex and varied. Due to this variety, it is unclear how
the form—organizational structure, relationship to gov-
ernment, and membership—influences the policy priori-
ties and subsequent actions of an FPC. This article only
addresses part of this complex puzzle by examining if
there is a relationship between an FPC’s form and its
policy priorities. This article focuses on the policy prior-
ities of an FPC because the policy priorities drive where
an FPC invests its resources. Policy priorities reflect the
food systems issues that FPCmembers identify as critical
to address collectively. Policy outputs (e.g., legislation)
and policy outcomes (e.g., individual health changes) can
take years to achieve (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999)
and are difficult to track and measure for one FPC let
alone across hundreds of FPCs. The outcomes of spe-
cific policy changes are especially hard tomeasure due to
the complexity of interrelated elements across a system.
These challenges with policy outputs and outcomes ex-
plain why the most comprehensive dataset available on
FPCs, used for this article, only tracks FPC policy priori-
ties. Using this dataset, we examine the patterns in the
relationships between how an FPC is structured, how it
works with government, and who participates in an FPC,
and the FPC’s policy priorities. In addition, we provide
three cases to illustrate how these relationships play out
in practice to create spaces for co-learning, deliberation,
and decision-making.
3. Methods
We use a mixed methods approach to examine the re-
lationship between an FPC’s form—organizational struc-
ture, relationship to government, andmembership—and
its policy priorities. First, we provide descriptive statistics
on characteristics of FPCs across the US. Next, we use
quantitative analysis to examine broad patterns in the re-
lationships between FPC formandpolicy priorities. Lastly,
we provide three cases to illuminate how these relation-
ships work in practice.
The data we use for the descriptive statistics and
quantitative analysis come froman annual survey of FPCs
conducted by CLF. The survey asks about an FPC’s ju-
risdiction level, contact information, internet presence,
year formed, governance structure, organizational and
policy priorities, funding, influences on policy work, gov-
ernment levels and issue areas of policy work, and no-
table accomplishments. One member of the FPC com-
pletes the survey for the FPC. The survey was sent out to
380 FPCs. If no responses were received after two email
reminders, council contacts were called up to two times
before the survey was closed. Survey responses were re-
ceived from 321 FPCs, but only responses from 222 FPCs
were analyzed for this article (our analysis excludes FPCs
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in Canada; those reporting to be inactive; ten duplicate
survey responses; one response that did not qualify as an
FPC; as well as FPCs that did not provide information on
membership, reported an “other” organizational struc-
ture, or were developing policy priorities).
The survey tells us if and how an FPC is incorpo-
rated as an organization (referred to as organizational
structure in the survey): 1) unincorporated or grassroots,
2) embedded—fiscally or administratively supported—in
an institution or a nonprofit organization, and 3) stand-
alone nonprofit organization. Additionally, the survey
provides a crude assessment of membership; it only con-
siders if a sector is represented among the membership
of an FPC, not the total number of members nor num-
ber of members representing a sector. More importantly,
the information collected through the survey does not
tell us about the mechanisms of participation: how (if)
members are selected and how decisions are made.
We employ the bivariate Chi-square (𝜒2) test to ex-
amine patterns in relationships between an FPC’s or-
ganizational structure, relationship to government or
membership categories, and policy priorities (McCrum-
Gardner, 2008). For example, this test allows us to com-
pare FPCs that have and do not have a representative
in a particular membership category (e.g., health care)
and whether that FPC has a particular policy priority
(e.g., healthy food access), creating a two-by-two ma-
trix of possible results. Are differences in numbers in
the cells of the matrix random chance, or is there a
patterned difference between the two groups? A stan-
dard approach to determine significant relationships is
a p-value of <0.05 (McCrum-Gardner, 2008); significant
results mean that there is a correlation between the
two nominal variables that we are testing (with a 95%
certainty). However, p-values of up to 0.10 are com-
mon (90% certainty). Considering the literature recog-
nizes that p-values are continuous and that any cut-off
is arbitrary, we report any relationship up to a p-value
of 0.10. We did not test relationships with policy priori-
ties when the food systems issue area had less than five
observations because a sample size of fewer than five
can be problematic. We therefore excluded the bivari-
ate relationships with the policy priorities of food labor,
natural resources and environment, transportation, and
food processing. Further, while relying on p-values to de-
termine significance is debated (Amrhein, Greenland, &
McShane, 2019), they can still be useful as one type of
evidence when analyzing large datasets.
To illustrate some of the dynamics of the significant
relationships we found in the statistical analysis, we pro-
vide three cases of FPCs in Baltimore (Maryland), Adams
County (Pennsylvania), andAustin (Texas). The FPCswere
purposely sampled to yield the most relevant data to il-
luminate gaps left by the survey data (Yin, 2015). They
were selected based on the knowledge of the cases given
established relationships between CLF staff and the FPC.
This analysis uses a practitioner-action research frame-
work which “is carried out by professionals who are en-
gaged in researching…aspects of their own practice as
they engage in that practice” (Edwards & Talbot, 1994,
p. 52, as cited in Denscombe, 2014, p. 127). Three of the
authors are CLF staff who designed, conducted, and an-
alyzed the survey used in this article. The other author
serves as an adviser on the work of CLF with FPCs and is
a member of a local FPC and a state FPC. Such position-
alities provide us with rich experiences and context to
inform this article, with the goal of creating findings that
could be useful to FPCs (Denscombe, 2014). The content
was gathered through personal knowledge of the FPCs
and follow up with the FPCs for clarification. These cases
offer a sampling of the breadth of mechanisms that FPCs
use to engage participants.
4. Findings
In the following section,we present our findings from the
quantitative analysis and illustrative cases. First, we de-
tail the characteristics of FPCs across the US and then
present our survey analysis examining broad patterns
in the relationships between FPC form and policy priori-
ties. Finally, we describe three cases to demonstrate how
these relationships work in practice.
4.1. FPCs in the United States
FPCs have existed in the US since 1981, but have sig-
nificantly increased in number over the last decade.
Every year since 2009, 23 to 45 new FPCs were formed
(Bassarab, Santo, & Palmer, 2019). At the end of 2017,
there were 284 active FPCs in the US, based on data
collected from the annual survey of FPCs conducted by
CLF, historical data about FPCs maintained by CLF, and
data gathered from online searches to verify the ac-
tive status of FPCs. FPCs or similar groups are emerging
across the Global North, including in Canada, the United
Kingdom, Germany, and several other countries (Santo &
Moragues-Faus, 2019).
FPCs in the US are heterogeneous. Each council
weighs decisions about their geographic focus, organiza-
tional structure, structural autonomy from government,
and membership against the political, social, economic,
and demographic context of the area. Like a Rubik’s cube,
there are seemingly endless combinations but some
characteristics are more common. Most FPCs (71%) fo-
cus their work at the local level: city/municipality, county,
or both city/municipality and county. Only 8% of FPCs
work at the state level and 22%work at the regional level
(multiple counties). Additionally, themajority of FPCs are
embedded in an institution: 35% are sponsored by a non-
profit organization, 29% are embedded in government,
and 6% are housed in a university. Another 18% are un-
incorporated (grassroots) groups and 12% are nonprofit
organizations (Table 1).
Being embedded in government is only one way for
FPCs to connect with government. An FPC may be cre-
ated by legislation (17% of FPCs); include government
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Table 1. FPC structure (N = 222).
Structure N
Housed in a nonprofit 78
Embedded in government 64
Grassroots coalition 39
Nonprofit 27
Embedded in a university/college 14
employees or elected officials as members1 (86%); have
members appointed by government (21%); receive in-
kind support—meeting space or administrative help—
from government (40%); or receive funding from govern-
ment grants or appropriations (35%)―Table 2. We also
account for FPCs that have no relationship to govern-
ment. A relationship with government can lend credibil-
ity and legitimacy to the work of an FPC and thus enable
policy success, or it can hinder and evenhalt the efforts of
an FPC (Clancy et al., 2007; Santo&Moragues-Faus, 2019;
Scherb, Palmer, Frattaroli, & Pollack, 2012; Schiff, 2008).
Table 2. Relationship to government (N = 222).
Relationship N
Government appointed members 46
Government staff and elected officials are
members 183
In-kind support from government 89
Legislated by government 37
Financial support from government 78
No connection to government 55
FPCs’ membership consists of professional stakeholders,
public administrators, and elected officials from across
the food supply chain and interrelated issue areas, e.g.,
environment, education, economic development, and
health care. FPCmembership also includes lay stakehold-
ers, referred to as community members in the survey.
FPCs could report their membership composition by se-
lecting as many membership categories represented on
their council as necessary (Table 3). On average, FPCs
selected 10.84 (standard deviation 3.55) of the total 19
membership categories, with a range from 1 to 19. The
membership of the majority of FPCs (92%) includes a
community member. All but two FPCs have representa-
tion from professional sectors.
FPCs are woefully underfunded; 68% operate on an
annual budget of $10,000 or less (35% have no funding).
12% have an annual budget over $100,000. As FPCs ma-
ture, their funding increases slightly. Of the FPCs more
than five years old, 29% have an annual budget over
$25,000, compared to 11% of FPCs that are five years
or younger. The top three sources of financial support
for FPCs are in-kind donations, non-federal government
funding from grants or appropriations, and private foun-
dations. A challenge consistently reported by FPCs on the
annual survey is a lack of financial resources.
Table 3.Membership categories by FPC (N = 222).
Member Type N
Community 204
Public health 194
Anti-hunger/emergency food 192
College/university/community college 186
Food production 185
Government staff 174
Health care 145
Food retail 123
Economic development 119
Farm/food industry workers 119
Social justice 112
Elementary and secondary education 111
Faith-based organizations 102
Natural resources and environment 100
Food processing/distribution 91
Food waste/disposal 76
Elected official 66
Philanthropy 59
Youth 49
The charge of FPCs is to tackle issues facing their food
system, but they do not work across the entire food sup-
ply chain simultaneously. To understand how an FPC ap-
proaches the food system at a given time, the survey asks
FPCs to identify their top three policy priorities from a list
of 11 food systems issue areas. For the past three years,
healthy food access has been a priority for a majority
of FPCs. In 2018, healthy food access, economic devel-
opment, and anti-hunger were the most common policy
priorities (Table 4). More recently, we have seen FPCs pri-
oritizing food waste and food labor laws (Bassarab et al.,
2019; Morrill, Santo, & Bassarab, 2018).
Table 4. Policy priorities by FPC (N = 222).
Policy Priority N
Healthy food access 146
Economic development 96
Anti-hunger 81
Food production 69
Food procurement 63
Land use planning 58
Food waste/recovery 40
Local food processing 24
Transportation 18
Natural resources and environment 10
Food labor 4
1 Inclusion of government staff and elected officials in an FPC’s membership was asked in the survey question about membership. We include the count
of FPC membership with government staff and elected officials in both Tables 2 and 3 as this information is relevant to both an FPC’s relationship to
government and the composition of its membership. Table 2 shows the total number of FPCs with membership that includes a government employee,
an elected official, or both. Table 3 shows the number of FPCs with membership that includes a government staff or an elected official. There were
57 FPCs with membership that included both a government employee and elected official.
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4.2. Patterns in Relationships between Form and Policy
Priorities: Quantitative Results
Our findings on the relationships between an FPC’s form
and policy priorities from the bivariate analysis, shown
in Table 5, demonstrate that membership composition
and relationship to government have more bearing on
the policy priorities of an FPC than the organizational
structure. Organizational structure has one significant re-
lationship to policy priorities, namely if an FPC is a grass-
roots coalition, embedded in a nonprofit, or a nonprofit
itself, it is more likely to have policy priorities around pro-
duction. In contrast, both membership and relationship
to government have several significant relationshipswith
policy priorities.
As Table 6 shows, most types of relationships that
an FPC has with government have inverse relationships
with some policy priorities. Seven out of the ten signifi-
cant relationships suggest that FPCs put less priority on
certain issues. In other words, having a relationship with
government is related to what FPCs do not prioritize.
For example, FPCs that are embedded in government,
have government support (in-kind or financial), or have
government-appointed members are less likely to priori-
tize food production policy issues. Conversely, FPCs with
no connection to government aremore likely to prioritize
food production.
Overall, the relationships between amembership cat-
egory and the corresponding policy priority are positively
and significantly correlated (Table 7). Appendix A pro-
Table 5. Summary of bivariate relationships between form and policy priorities.
Form Policy Priorities
Organization type One significant relationship to a policy priority with p < 0.10
Relationship to government Ten significant relationships to policy priorities with p < 0.10; Five significant relationships
to policy priorities with p < 0.05
Membership Twenty-four significant relationships to policy priorities with p < 0.10; Fifteen significant
relationship to policy with p < 0.05
Table 6. Significant relationships between policy priorities and relationship to government.
Relationship to Government Relationship to Policy Priority (p-value)
Embedded in government Less prioritization of food production (0.077)
Government appointed members Less prioritization of food production (0.058)
In-kind support from government Less prioritization of food production (0.023)
Greater prioritization of food waste/recovery (0.034)
Financial support from government Less prioritization of food production (0.080)
Greater prioritization of land use planning (0.076)
Legislated by government Less prioritization of healthy food access (0.077)
Greater prioritization of food waste/recovery (0.012)
No connection to government Greater prioritization of food production (0.003)
Greater prioritization of land use planning (0.003)
Table 7.Membership significantly related to topically similar policy priorities.
Membership Category Relationship to Policy Priority (p-value)
Anti-hunger/emergency food Greater prioritization of anti-hunger (0.001)
Faith-based organizations Greater prioritization of anti-hunger (0.008)
Food waste/recovery Greater prioritization of food waste/recovery (0.000)
Food production Greater prioritization of food production (0.080)
Economic development Greater prioritization of economic development (0.010)
Elementary and secondary education Greater prioritization of food procurement (0.026)
Food retail Greater prioritization of food procurement (0.015)
Youth Greater prioritization of food procurement (0.067)
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vides a full reporting of all relationships. The priorities of
food waste/recovery, anti-hunger/emergency food, and
land use planning have more significant relationships to
membership categories than other priorities. One expla-
nation is that some policy priorities are common across
all FPCs (e.g., healthy food access) or prioritized overall
by very few FPCs (e.g., land use planning). Additionally,
some membership categories are related to more policy
priorities than others. For example, havingmembers rep-
resenting faith-based organizations is significantly cor-
related to three of the seven policy priorities while
members representing anti-hunger/emergency food are
correlated with two policy priorities. Government staff,
elected officials, and community members are not corre-
lated with any policy priorities. Because nearly all FPCs
have community members, we would not expect any
significant differences in relationship to policy priorities
across councils.
4.3. Illustrations of Collaborative Governance and Food
Democracy in Practice: Case Studies
The three examples described below illustrate howmem-
bers are engaged in the process of determining an FPC’s
policy priorities. In particular, these cases highlight the
choices that FPCs make regarding who and how they re-
cruit members, as well as the interplay between mem-
bers, authority, and decision-making. The cases describe
an open, self-selected membership process, an applica-
tion process, and a process by which members are ap-
pointed. The FPCs featured work at different levels (city,
city-county, county) and have different structures (initia-
tive of city government, advisory board of city-county
government, nonprofit in small town). These differences
further contextualize the influence of an FPC’s relation-
ships to government and organizational structure on its
policy priorities.
4.3.1. Adams County, Pennsylvania
Adams County, Pennsylvania, is a mostly rural county
with an estimated population of just over 100,000 in
2017. The main town in the county, Gettysburg, had a
population of around 7,600 in 2017. While the Adams
County Food Policy Council (ACFPC) was established
through a county proclamation in 2009, it is housed
within Healthy Adams County, a nonprofit organization.
The FPC’s structure is non-hierarchical; there is no official
leader, but logistics and meetings are coordinated by a
facilitator. While membership is self-selecting and open
to anyone who wants to participate, it mainly attracts
professionals from government, academia, health care,
and nonprofits working on related issues. Approximately
12 to 15 people regularly attend meetings in a volunteer
capacity. Community input is sought periodically during
a forum whereby anyone who wants to participate is in-
vited to share their opinions and outreach to community
members who receive services from organizations that
participate in the ACFPC. This input informs the ACFPC’s
actions, although there is not a formal process for deter-
mining policy priorities.
At one forum, community members identified two
issues affecting access to healthy food: the need for
farmers and consumers to better understand each oth-
ers’ needs and constraints, and better advertisement
and collaboration around existing healthy food initiatives.
The ACFPC acted on this input by helping the Adams
County Farmers Market Association (ACFMA) determine
if closing a weekday market and only hosting a Saturday
market would have a negative impact on low-income
customers. To inform the ACFMA’s decision, the ACFPC
surveyed low-income participants of member organiza-
tions to see if dropping the weekday market day would
severely hinder their ability to access healthy food. The
conclusion was that while a small percentage of atten-
dees could not attend a Saturday market, the majority
could and would attend a market on Saturdays. The sur-
vey also provided the ACFPC an opportunity to increase
understanding between farmers and consumers by talk-
ing about the implications for small farmers when busi-
ness is much slower at the weekday market. The ACFPC
keeps the discussions during the community fora inmind
whenmaking decisions about their priorities and actions.
4.3.2. Baltimore, Maryland
Baltimore is the largest city in the state of Maryland
and has a majority African American population. Housed
within the city government and funded by the city, the
Baltimore Food Policy Initiative (BFPI) engages govern-
ment staff, elected officials, and professional and lay
stakeholders through three approaches: 1) intra-agency
collaboration, 2) the Food Policy Action Coalition (FPAC),
and 3) the Resident Food Equity Advisors (RFEA). The
City’s Food Policy Director and two staff housed in the
Planning Department work with other government staff
throughout the city on food systems issues.
FPAC is an open network of more than 60 self-
selected people, mostly professionals from area non-
profit and community organizations, businesses, as well
as university faculty and students whose work intersects
with food systems. The network meets quarterly. This
format allows for participation from a wider network of
actors, but those who choose to participate in FPAC do
not reflect the majority of Baltimore’s population and
are generally not people directly affected by food sys-
tem problems (Swartz, Santo, & Neff, 2018). Quarterly
meetings consist of formal presentations and informal
networking, whereby FPAC members learn from one an-
other and share ideas with BFPI staff on current policy
issues. FPAC members also approach BFPI staff as pol-
icy issues arise because of relationship building efforts
by BFPI staff outside of the meetings. FPAC members’ in-
put, along with BFPI staff’s own assessment of the fea-
sibility of changing a policy, help BFPI select which poli-
cies to focus on. In this interaction, FPAC fulfills a comple-
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mentary role as described by Klijn and Skelcher (2007) to
BFPI, allowing professional and lay stakeholders to listen
and learn about policy issues in the city and to have their
“say” in providing advice in the policy process.
Recognizing the need for a more deliberate means of
eliciting residents’ perspectives, BFPI formed the RFEA in
2017. Supported by a stipend, one resident from each
council district in the city is selected through an applica-
tion process to serve as an adviser to BFPI staff on food
system issues facing the city. Over the course of six meet-
ings, RFEA and BFPI staff convene to hear presentations
from content experts, converse about their experiences
related to the issue, deliberate about solutions, and craft
appropriate policy recommendations. While BFPI staff
make the final decision about recommendations, they
are there to learn from residents about what they think
will work. Advisers are invited to meet with their elected
council member to share their experiences and to talk
about the group’s recommended food policy strategies.
By recognizing and integrating the voices of those most
affected by food policy decisions into their work, BFPI is
facilitating a transition in democratic participation from
representational to participatory democracy.
4.3.3. Austin, Texas
Austin, the state capital of Texas, is home to nearly
a million people. Established in 2008 through local or-
dinances, the Austin Travis County Food Policy Board
(ATCFPB) is a 13-member advisory board for the City
of Austin and surrounding Travis County. Board mem-
bers are appointed by the City Council and the County
Commissioners. Members are encouraged to represent
a diversity of sectors across the food supply chain
but there are no required sector-specific positions.
Appointed members decide which policies to recom-
mend to local government staff and elected officials. The
Board is supported by four working groups with open,
self-selected membership and coordinated by City and
County staff. Working groups serve as technical advisers
to the Board around specific food systems issues. Citizens
are invited to participate in aworking group or to express
their opinions during an allotted time at the beginning of
the Board’s monthly meetings.
As appointed representatives, Board members must
navigate suggestions from self-selected members of
working groups, the preferences of a broader network,
as well as their own professional and personal interests.
This balancing act led the Board to punt on a decision
on a paid sick leave bill proposed by the Austin City
Council. Faced with a recommendation from the Healthy
Food Access Working Group to support the bill, as well
as mixed recommendations to support and not support
the bill from business and community organizations from
the wider Austin community, the Board decided to nei-
ther support nor oppose the bill. The bill, however, was
eventually passed by Austin City Council because of over-
whelming support expressed by attendees at a commu-
nity inputmeeting held by the Austin City Council (Morrill
et al., 2018). At the center of the debatewas a complex is-
sue steeped in opposition frombusinesses that are better
resourced and have more access to public officials than
other stakeholders, such as workers and their representa-
tives. Collaborative governance networks are prone to im-
balance if there is not a way to equalize the capacity, re-
sources, authority, and status ofmembers (Ansell &Gash,
2008). The ATCFPB tried to balance the views of propo-
nents from the working group and community organiza-
tions with opposing views from Boardmembers and busi-
nesses through a null vote. This vote held the ATCFPB ac-
countable to both the Board and the working group but
ultimately did not represent the desire of the community.
5. Discussion
The analysis above adds to the existing debate about
how FPCs’ forms relate to their policy work. Our findings
demonstrate that membership and relationship to gov-
ernment havemore bearing on the policy priorities of an
FPC than the organizational structure (although the re-
lationship to government is related to the lack of some
priorities rather than their presence). Further, by illumi-
nating the relationship between membership and policy
priorities, and often policy development itself, the case
studies underscore the role of FPCs as vehicles for food
democracy. FPCs use a collaborative governance frame-
work because it allows citizens with varying interests to
grapple with the complexities of food systems issues, de-
liberate on appropriate and timely strategies, and collec-
tively agree on directions to pursue for policy change.
This study shows that members matter; membership
is related to a wide range of policy priorities. Some pol-
icy priorities have significant relationships with multiple
membership categories. For example, the priority of food
waste and recovery bears significant relationships with
members representing anti-hunger organizations (recip-
ients of excess food), food processing and distribution
(involved in coordinating logistics for delivery of excess
food), food waste, health care (for whom hunger and
health are intricately linked), natural resources and en-
vironment (for whom wasted food represents wasted
water and greenhouse gas emissions), and philanthropy.
These relationships align with national campaigns to re-
duce food waste. This alignment raises questions about
the degree to which national efforts influence the deci-
sions of FPCs and whether FPCs can serve as a gateway
to increase civic engagement at a national level.
Additionally, for some membership sectors, there is
a relationship between the policy priority and the sec-
tor that the member represents. For instance, FPCs with
members representing economic development aremore
likely to prioritize economic development policies while
those with farmers, ranchers, or small producer advo-
cacy groups are more likely to prioritize food production
policies. The relationships between sector representa-
tion and policy priorities are of particular interest in con-
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sideration of whose values are being represented by the
FPC. In an analysis of two local government planning pro-
cesses, Baldy and Kruse (2019) point out that the values
represented by members participating in the processes
are complex and varied and based both on their personal
experiences and professional role. Further research is
needed to understand if members are representing the
interests of their employer, an area of the food system
for which they have a deep interest, or a particular de-
mographic of the community.
FPCs struggle with community representation both
in determining who counts as community members and
how community members are included in FPC decisions.
While most FPCs report to have members that repre-
sent the community, it is often unclear how FPCs de-
fine community members. Do they include lay stake-
holders with a vested interest in an issue and willing to
participate for free, people affected by problems with
the food system, socially marginalized communities, low-
income communities, minority populations, or people
traditionally excluded from economic and political pro-
cesses? A few lay stakeholders amongst a dozen paid pro-
fessionals could cause an imbalance in decision-making.
Collaborative governance approaches can be designed
to build the capacity of members at a disadvantage
(Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).
Not all mechanisms for participation are equal, but
the survey used for this article does not collect infor-
mation about member selection (open, self-selecting,
or targeted recruitment) or authority (voting members
of a steering committee or non-voting expert advisers
of a working group). These distinctions are important
to understand the power dynamics among members in
setting the policy agenda for an FPC. For instance, the
ACFPC and the BFPI Resident Food Equity Advisors use
an open, self-selecting process formember participation,
yet mostly paid professionals participate. Such a format
poses the risk that members are recruited through ex-
isting networks, which could inhibit inclusiveness and
exacerbate inequity and underrepresentation of certain
groups. Additionally, somemembers, such as profession-
als, may be perceived to have more expertise or au-
thority because they have more resources and capac-
ity. They may also represent the priorities of organiza-
tions outside of the community. Further, as Sieveking
(2019) found with the Oldenburg FPC in Germany, open-
ness of membership, and the resulting diversity, can bog
down decision-making processes. Allowing elected offi-
cials to appoint members, such as the ATCFPB however,
could also exclude stakeholders who traditionally lack
economic capital, knowledge, or capacity to engage in
the policy process. FPCs struggle to find a balance be-
tween harnessing the energy of those eager to trans-
form food systems, learning from those with food sys-
tems and policy expertise, and empowering those im-
pacted by food systems issues.
Amembership process that deliberately places those
who experience the effects of policy decisions in a po-
sition to influence policy can add to the effectiveness
and equity of policy decisions (Fung&Wright, 2001). The
BFPI Resident Food Equity Advisors program elevates the
authority of residents in food policy decisions by specifi-
cally selecting residents to work directly with local gov-
ernment staff on policy recommendations. The ACFPC
also tries to elevate the perspectives of residents who
are affected by food systems issues in the FPC’s decisions
and actions through direct outreach to them. Our find-
ings reinforce those of the Koski et al. (2018) case that
the engagement process is important to ensure member
representation on paper, in practice, and in the selection
of policy priorities.
An FPC’s relationship to government also bears a
number of significant relationships to its policy priorities.
Unlike membership, however, there is a significant in-
verse relationship between food production and an FPC’s
relationship to local government. One plausible expla-
nation is that many regulatory issues (e.g., crop insur-
ance, organic certification, food safety) facing farmers
and ranchers are the result of federal policy decisions.
While some FPCs do follow and advocate on federal poli-
cies, participation in the federal policy process requires
different strategies and diminishes the effectiveness of
policies to address place-based problems.
The aim of FPCs to create greater pathways for cit-
izen participation in the policy process can only be
achieved with government cooperation. Elected officials
and public administratorsmust bewilling to engage in co-
learning, deliberation, and power-sharing withmembers
of society, as shown in the case of the BFPI RFEA program.
The effectiveness and sustainability of an FPC as a collab-
orative governance network is questionable without this
willingness. Other scholarship on FPCs has shown that
an unwillingness by government staff to make the pol-
icy process accessible to citizens and attempts to impose
the agenda of appointed or elected officials on an FPC
can reduce the effectiveness or lead to the dissolution of
FPCs (Coplen & Cuneo, 2015; Gupta et al., 2018; van de
Griend, Duncan, & Wiskerke, 2019).
Organizational structure is not an irrelevant factor
for FPCs, but our findings echo DiGiulio’s (2017) findings
that it does not drive policy decisions. An FPC’s organiza-
tional structure can influence membership composition
and the power dynamics amongst members, particularly
for FPCs embedded in government or where members
are appointed. In the case of the ATCFPB, the members
appointed to the Board by local elected officials repre-
sented certain interests (e.g., businesses) that had opin-
ions contrary to the desires of the community. For BFPI,
an FPC embedded in government, determining its policy
agenda and strategies often depends on political timing
and agency collaboration and readiness.
6. Conclusion
Communities across the US are being confronted with
food insecurity, unequal access to healthy food, family
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farm hardships, climate disruptions to food production,
and other food systems related problems. Food democ-
racy can be viewed as both a goal (output) to transform
current food systems by addressing these problems that
have arisen from imbalances in power, as well as a pro-
cess of policymaking around food systems by (input) and
with (throughput) citizens.We explore how collaborative
governance networks in the form of FPCs are fora to en-
gage citizens in the process of food democracy. The FPC
framework is particularly useful for navigating the com-
plexity of food systems and for negotiating policy strate-
gies that address issues that members could not tackle
alone. Our findings corroborate their collaborative na-
ture, demonstrating that who sits on an FPC, and to a
lesser extent, how they are connected to government,
are key in shaping which issues FPCs address in their pol-
icy work. In this way, FPCs organize participation, and yet
filter participation by determining rules for membership
and decision-making.
These findings both reveal new insights and raise
questions about FPCs’ contributions to food democracy.
On one hand, the importance of members’ sectoral back-
grounds in determining policy priorities underscores that
their perspectives are informing which issues councils
act on. On the other hand, there are dynamics of FPCs’
decision-making process that we still do not fully under-
stand. Issues of representation, power, and trust are not
unique to FPCs. There may, however, be elements about
the systems nature of food issues that make it uniquely
challenging to focus the decisions and actions of an
FPC, and to meaningfully incorporate perspectives from
across the food system, especially of those who are tra-
ditionally excluded from the policy process. Additionally,
while FPCmembership fluctuates, policy change is a long
game. Little is known about how transitions in mem-
bership affect the priorities and ultimate outcomes of
FPCs. Future research could explore the power dynamics,
policy deliberation, and conflict resolution processes in-
volved in member participation on councils, particularly
over time.
Since our analysis did not explore FPC policy out-
comes, we are left with further questions around the
goal of food democracy—that is, if and how FPC pol-
icy outcomes yield transformative food systems change.
FPCs provide mechanisms for citizen participation in
the policy process at local and state levels, but many
of the challenges in the food system—especially those
food democracy purports to address, such as corporate
hegemony—stem from federal and global political de-
cisions. Could FPCs build the capacity and interest of
citizens to engage in higher levels of food policy advo-
cacy? Does involvement with an FPC increase efficacy
and encourage political participation beyond food sys-
tems? Amidst the current polarization and skepticism in
US politics, the growing interest in FPCs may offer hope
that people are recognizing the need to collaborate and
(re)engage in democratic processes to ensure their val-
ues are reflected in policies at all levels of government.
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Appendix. Membership categories by policy priorities (N = 222). Note: Only two of the four cells are shown from each
chi-square test. The two cells shown are those FPCs with members in the category and the two cells not shown are the
cells for FPCs without that membership category.
Table A1. Food procurement.
Member Category No Yes p-value
Government staff 125 49 0.891
Elected officials 48 18 0.812
Anti-hunger/emergency food 141 51 0.129
College/university/community college 132 54 0.623
Community 147 57 0.627
Economic development 80 39 0.118
Elementary and secondary education 72 39 0.026
Faith-based organizations 69 31 0.433
Farm/food industry workers 84 35 0.714
Processing and distribution 65 26 0.985
Food production 133 52 0.842
Food retail 80 43 0.015
Food waste/recovery 53 23 0.653
Health care 105 40 0.719
Natural resources and environment 74 28 0.778
Philanthropy 40 19 0.447
Public health 136 58 0.186
Social justice 82 30 0.595
Youth 30 19 0.067
Table A2. Healthy food access.
Member Category No Yes p-value
Government staff 55 119 0.117
Elected officials 23 43 0.900
Anti-hunger/emergency food 64 128 0.474
College/university/community college 68 118 0.097
Community 70 134 0.933
Economic development 43 76 0.521
Elementary and secondary education 34 77 0.258
Faith-based organizations 32 68 0.525
Farm/food industry workers 42 77 0.721
Processing and distribution 31 60 0.965
Food production 66 119 0.311
Food retail 44 79 0.590
Food waste/recovery 29 47 0.374
Health care 54 91 0.195
Natural resources and environment 44 58 0.010
Philanthropy 18 41 0.482
Public health 66 128 0.860
Social justice 40 72 0.639
Youth 15 34 0.545
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Table A3. Food waste/recovery.
Member Category No Yes p-value
Government staff 141 33 0.484
Elected officials 51 15 0.235
Anti-hunger/emergency food 154 38 0.082
College/university/community college 151 35 0.481
Community 165 39 0.151
Economic development 100 19 0.393
Elementary and secondary education 88 23 0.295
Faith-based organizations 79 21 0.295
Farm/food industry workers 96 23 0.585
Processing and distribution 67 24 0.007
Food production 150 35 0.435
Food retail 100 23 0.768
Food waste/recovery 46 30 0.000
Health care 114 31 0.074
Natural resources and environment 77 25 0.020
Philanthropy 44 15 0.084
Public health 157 37 0.282
Social justice 89 23 0.325
Youth 39 10 0.622
Table A4. Anti-hunger.
Member Category No Yes p-value
Government staff 107 67 0.234
Elected officials 38 28 0.232
Anti-hunger/emergency food 114 78 0.001
College/university/community college 113 73 0.052
Community 128 76 0.423
Economic development 79 40 0.339
Elementary and secondary education 67 44 0.329
Faith-based organizations 54 46 0.008
Farm/food industry workers 78 41 0.499
Processing and distribution 56 35 0.610
Food production 119 66 0.575
Food retail 80 43 0.598
Food waste/recovery 47 29 0.709
Health care 82 63 0.003
Natural resources and environment 71 31 0.082
Philanthropy 36 23 0.642
Public health 123 71 0.929
Social justice 79 33 0.028
Youth 28 21 0.294
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Table A5. Land use planning.
Member Category No Yes p-value
Government staff 127 47 0.568
Elected officials 48 18 0.800
Anti-hunger/emergency food 140 52 0.411
College/university/community college 141 45 0.136
Community 150 54 0.694
Economic development 90 29 0.522
Elementary and secondary education 90 21 0.015
Faith-based organizations 82 18 0.013
Farm/food industry workers 90 29 0.522
Processing and distribution 71 20 0.241
Food production 135 50 0.494
Food retail 88 35 0.379
Food waste/recovery 53 23 0.311
Health care 114 31 0.027
Natural resources and environment 71 31 0.182
Philanthropy 45 14 0.625
Public health 145 49 0.438
Social justice 77 35 0.080
Youth 34 15 0.418
Table A6. Food production.
Member Category No Yes p-value
Government staff 118 56 0.499
Elected officials 44 22 0.637
Anti-hunger/emergency food 133 59 0.774
College/university/community college 128 58 0.941
Community 80 39 0.118
Economic development 81 38 0.768
Elementary and secondary education 78 33 0.664
Faith-based organizations 77 23 0.019
Farm/food industry workers 85 34 0.385
Processing and distribution 63 28 0.933
Food production 123 62 0.080
Food retail 84 39 0.822
Food waste/recovery 53 23 0.849
Health care 102 43 0.529
Natural resources and environment 65 37 0.123
Philanthropy 42 17 0.661
Public health 133 61 0.759
Social justice 81 31 0.269
Youth 35 14 0.667
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Table A7. Economic development.
Member Category No Yes p-value
Government staff 97 77 0.563
Elected officials 39 27 0.648
Anti-hunger/emergency food 113 79 0.111
College/university/community college 103 83 0.345
Community 43 76 0.521
Economic development 58 61 0.010
Elementary and secondary education 64 47 0.786
Faith-based organizations 61 39 0.248
Farm/food industry workers 67 52 0.883
Processing and distribution 51 40 0.858
Food production 101 84 0.146
Food retail 64 59 0.113
Food waste/recovery 46 30 0.413
Health care 82 63 0.933
Natural resources and environment 58 44 0.977
Philanthropy 29 30 0.169
Public health 110 84 0.965
Social justice 59 53 0.216
Youth 27 22 0.791
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